Skip to content

Policy — Personal Assistant Tool Scope (Accepted Broad Grant)

Guide

Policy — Personal Assistant Tool Scope (Accepted Broad Grant)

HR documentation · binding on every employee and advisor. Decision record for security audit finding S-3 (2026-05-30).

Decision

The Personal Assistant’s broad tool grant is consciously accepted.

The PA carries no tools: restriction in its agent frontmatter and therefore inherits the full available toolset. This is not an oversight — it is a deliberate, recorded grant.

Rationale

The PA is the orchestration layer for the Principal. Its job is to:

  1. Route work to every unit in the org. The PA coordinates HR, the Archivist, Golden Rule, the Documentarian, and any future unit. Routing means reading artifacts, writing handoff briefs, and running lightweight coordination tasks across all surface areas.
  2. Handle logistics via integrations. Calendar, email, file lookup, and Notion all require write access. Restricting the PA to a narrow tool scope would prevent it from doing its primary job.
  3. Act as the sole personal-information holder. Because no other agent may touch the Principal’s personal data, the PA must be capable of acting on that data on behalf of the Principal — which requires broad capability, not a narrow lane.
  4. Serve a single, trusted principal. Unlike unit agents that may be invoked by automated or delegated paths, the PA is direct staff to the Principal only. There is no multi-tenant or cross-user exposure.

The security concern — that a broad tool grant concentrates blast radius — is real but is mitigated by the PA’s existing guardrails:

  • Confirm before irreversible or outward-facing actions (explicit in the agent spec): the PA drafts first and acts only on explicit approval.
  • Personal data never leaves the PA — not archived, not published, not handed to other agents in raw form (confidentiality policy).
  • Least-privilege still governs all other agents. The PA’s broad grant is the exception that proves the rule; every other agent is scoped to its role.

Scope of acceptance

Accepted Not accepted
Full toolset including Read, Write, Edit, Bash, Grep, Glob, and all granted MCP tools Any future integration that grants new external write access without an SOP-001 access request
Routing and coordination work across all units Direct edits to governance files (CLAUDE.md, ORG.md, CONTRIBUTING.md) — those route to their owners
Logistics (email drafts, calendar, Notion) on the Principal’s behalf Sending, posting, or scheduling on the Principal’s behalf without explicit per-action approval

Conditions

This acceptance is conditional on the following controls remaining in place:

  1. The PA agent spec’s guardrails (confirm before irreversible/outward actions; draft first) are maintained and not weakened.
  2. The PA remains direct staff to the Principal only — it is not invoked by automated pipelines or other agents except as a routing target.
  3. Any new external integration added to the PA follows SOP-001 (access request) before the tool is wired in.
  4. This decision is revisited if the PA’s responsibilities or trust model change materially (e.g. multi-user, automated triggers without human review).

Record

Field Value
Finding S-3 — PA inherits all tools (security audit 2026-05-30)
Decision date 2026-05-30
Decision Accept — conscious, conditional grant
Owner Principal
Review trigger Change to PA trust model or scope